Abstract. Through theories of agenda setting and innovation, the origin, development, and enactment of right-to-die policy in four Western nations-the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, and Great Britain-are examined. Different social and government structures produced varied right-to-die politics in each of these countries, although similar issues received more emphasis in Europe. However, it is discovered that policy entrepreneurs, organizations, and governments are important in similar ways in moving the issue from the public to the governmental agenda and to policy innovations in each country. The paper is concluded with a discussion of elements to be included in a model of agenda setting and innovation and with a proposal for the application of theory to a wider range of policies.
During the past several decades there has been a dramatic increase in the ability of medicine to extend life and prolong the dying process, and much has been written about the right to die in magazines and newspapers, in religious, legal, and medical journals, and in books. However, most of this writing focuses on ethics and is designed to influence policymakers and practitioners.
There is surprisingly little political analysis of the right to die. One exception involves the use of theories of agenda setting and innovation to analyze how the right-to-die issue originated and developed into state and national policies in the United States (Glick, 1992) . Fino and Strate (1993) also have examined agenda setting in the evolution of physician-assisted suicide in Michigan.
The right to die is not unique to the United States. New frontiers in medical technology accompanied by new ethical issues have made the right to die a controversial political and social issue in virtually all advanced industrialized nations. In this paper we survey the evolution of this issue in the United States and three other Western countries in order to broaden the understanding of the right to die in comparable settings and to contribute to the agenda-setting and innovation literatures in the emerging field of comparative public policy. We begin by distinguishing the various forms of the right to die. Next, we highlight the major elements of agenda setting and innovation. We apply these concepts to the politics of the right to die in the United States, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Germany. This set of four postindustrial democracies reflects our desire for a 'most-similar-systems' design in which points of resemblance are more salient than those of difference (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) .
Quantitative and qualitative comparative research has been done on the right to die in the United States (Glick, 1992) , and we rely on that research here, but for the three European countries we must reanalyze and interpret secondary sources. Data on agenda setting and innovation are most complete for the Netherlands, where the right to die has become a well-developed national policy, and we can glean sufficient information for Germany and Great Britain to provide comparative case studies.
issues are reduced to fewer concerns to government and still fewer on which government takes action.
Issues often reach the professional agenda first by appearing frequently in professional literature, which journalists publicize in the mass media. Greater exposure leads the broader mass public to pay closer attention to a highlighted problem. Broad public interest, continued demands by elites for action, and major political events or natural catastrophes frequently lead issues to the governmental agenda and on to innovation (Walker, 1977) .
Inside and outside strategies
As Schattschneider (1975, page 3) observes, "the most important strategy of politics is concerned with the scope of conflict". Experts and sympathetic legislators or government staff utilize different agenda-setting strategies (Arnold, 1990; Baumgartner, 1989; Campbell, 1992; Hogwood, 1987; Kingdon, 1973) . When elites are able to dominate the policymaking process, they employ inside political strategies by controlling issue content and making new issues appear as routine, limited, logical, and noncontroversial outgrowths of previous policies (Arnold, 1990, pages 99-198) . They seek to avoid attracting mass attention and other interests, which frequently stir political conflict and opposition.
The alternative to the inside model is a pluralist or outside political strategy which involves group conflict and competition on new and controversial issues. "It is the loser who calls in outside help" (Schattschneider, 1975, page 16 ). Realizing they can neither control the scope or definition of an issue nor limit disagreement, professional elites and activists accept the need for political battle, and they openly attempt to develop broad support for change by expanding public awareness through the mass media (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Burstein, 1985; Cobb et al, 1976; Walker, 1977) .
When an issue reaches the mass agenda, there is often a period of intense coverage or 'alarmed discovery', followed by a dampening of interest as the costs and complications of handling the issue are revealed (Downs, 1972) . In time, an issue may fade from public view, resulting in a 'nondecision' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1963) by risk-averse lawmakers who prefer that the issue be 'processed off the agenda (Hogwood, 1987, pages 46-47) . Therefore, the survival of a controversial policy proposal depends on keeping the issue on the public agenda. Issue maintenance is often led by a single sponsor or policy entrepreneur (Campbell, 1992; Hargrove, 1987 , Kingdon, 1984 .
Of all political arenas, legislatures are the most visible and public and the location for political conflict and opposition, the right-to-die issue has been controversial in every country, and inside legislative strategies have never been successful. In contrast, judicial and executive policies are much less visible. Courts generally are accessible to those with genuine disputes and necessary resources, and economic and other regulated groups often have easy access to executive agencies. Therefore, policy proponents are less able to limit or shape judicial and executive agendas. But when courts and executive agencies refuse access, groups sometimes use outside strategies by seeking exposure through public relations and demonstrations to force official attention. Then, controversial judicial or executive decisions sometimes drive issues onto legislative agendas as well (Bosso, 1987; Dister, 1988; Melnick, 1983) .
Innovation
An innovation usually is defined as any policy, idea, or procedure that is new to a potential adopter even if the policy had been adopted previously by others (Eyestone, 1977; Gray, 1973; Rogers, 1962; Savage, 1985; Walker, 1969) .
There are three approaches to the study of political innovation. The largest body of research examines the timing of the adoption of innovations by governments and the political, social and economic correlates of the decision to enact a new policy. Generally, the wealthiest, most urban and industrial states are more likely to be early innovators (Canon and Baum, 1981; Glick, 1981; Gray, 1973; Rogers, 1983; Savage, 1978; .
Others have examined how extensively governments use particular innovations. Examples include studies of how much public housing governments build and the percentage of offenders placed in community-based correction programs (Bingham, 1976; Downs, 1976; Glick, 1981; Gray and Williams, 1973) . The main concern in such research is how thoroughly or heavily governments implement an innovation.
A third type is policy reinvention, which examines the evolution of policy over time as new governments adopt a similar type of innovation or refine previous policies. Later adopters become aware of the experience of earlier innovators and react to everchanging social and political conditions and demands that lead them to adopt new versions of previous policies (Allen and Clark, 1981; Clark, 1985; Clark and French, 1984; Glick and Hays, 1991; Rogers, 1983) . The likelihood of reinvention during the period of diffusion means that policy research needs simultaneously to examine the spread and changing content of policies.
Although much innovation research is confined to a single polity, scholars have recently focused attention on cross-national 'policy transfer' (Wolman, 1992) , 'lesson-drawing' (Rose, 1993) , and 'convergence' and 'emulation' (Bennett, 1991) . There is evidence that governments deliberately emulate the policies of other nations (Collier and Messick, 1975; Heclo, 1974; Leichter, 1979; Schneider and Ingram, 1988) . For example, Kelman (1981) finds that worker safety regulations adopted in Sweden were directly influenced by federal standards in the United States. Similarly, the 1965 and 1968 British Race Relations Acts borrowed heavily from US national and state laws (Lester and Bindman, 1972) , and the first income tax in the United States was 'copied' from Britain (Waltman, 1980, page 17) .
Integrating agenda setting and innovation Agenda setting and innovation are inextricably linked, but researchers rarely examine both processes for the same issue. To understand how and why governments respond to certain problems, it is necessary to examine how they previously developed as social and political issues. The connections are more complicated than one political process simply growing from another, for an issue may have reached the innovation stage in one state or country but be limited to the social agenda in another. Local as well as national events and varying state and national contexts, traditions, structures, and institutions all influence how governments respond to competing issues on the agenda. One state's innovation also may stimulate another to move further along to the decisional agenda and ultimately to innovation. Consequently, it is necessary to link these two streams of political activity and be sensitive to why they develop in various ways in different political systems.
In addition, research needs to build bridges across the political institutions that are involved in the development of policy. For example, most agenda-setting and innovation research has been focused either on legislatures or on courts, but not on both. But various policy research has shown that both of these institutions have created important and often competing public policies that affect the public differently. We now proceed to examine right-to-die policymaking in four countries in order to contribute to the development of general propositions about agenda setting and innovation.
The United States
In the United States, health policies and medical practice traditionally have been regulated by state governments, and only recently has right-to-die policymaking occurred at the national level. Interstate communications and major events have produced similar patterns of agenda setting and innovation, but policymaking has proceeded separately in each of the fifty states.
Agenda setting
The right to die attracted greatest attention in 1976 when the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first high-level government institution to permit the withdrawal of treatment from a permanently comatose patient. However, the right to die had been on the public agenda for a much longer period. In 1938 a group of US intellectuals formed the American Euthanasia Society, modeled on a similar British organization, and, like its British counterpart, the group lobbied unsuccessfully for state voluntary active euthanasia laws. World War 2 and the Holocaust further reduced the likelihood of legislation, but public concern with the right to die continued to grow.
During the late 1950s and 1960s modern medicine vastly increased its ability to treat serious illnesses and to prolong life, and many more people found themselves or family members facing invasive treatment that sometimes added months or years but rarely restored patients to health or a high quality of life. However, physicians often believed that they must do everything to keep patients alive and they feared lawsuits or criminal prosecution if they ceased life-prolonging treatment.
In addition, highly publicized mercy killing cases, most frequently involving family members, continued to reach the courts. However, judges imposed very lenient sentences, reflecting the dilemma between the formal requirements of law and sympathy for victims and defendants. However, these trials did nothing to resolve the conflict or settle public policy.
Early right-to-die proposals focused on voluntary active euthanasia for suffering adults, although a few doctors also favoured involuntary euthanasia for 'born defectives'. But lacking support, most advocates for the right to die shifted to proposals for the withdrawal or withholding of unwanted treatment. Nevertheless, some activists believe that curtailing treatment helps few people and does not end horrible suffering, and proposals for voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide are becoming significant parts of the right-to-die agenda.
Early supporters of the withdrawal and withholding of treatment usually were individual physicians, college professors, nurses, relatives of the sick and injured, and other medical professionals who described to state legislative committees cases of prolonged suffering resulting from life-sustaining medical care. But, except for the national Society for the Right to Die (now, Concern for Dying), no organizations supported the right to die in the early years, and proponents carried little weight.
More important, the Catholic Church and right-to-life organizations have opposed legislation. These well-organized and politically sophisticated groups have lobbied against most bills and often have appeared as amici curiae in state appellate courts to argue for narrow interpretations of patients' rights.
By the late 1960s the power of medical miracles to lengthen hopeless lives had a cumulative impact on physicians and other health professionals, and they led all other groups in paying closer attention to right-to-die issues. Medical interest was followed in the early 1970s by increased awareness by lawyers and Catholic writers, but other professional groups paid little attention. Broad public awareness came a few years later, fed mostly by the medical agenda as journalists began, in newspapers and popular magazines, to report heavily on medical stories. Polling on the right to die also began again, after more than a twenty-year absence.
During the 1970s, significant national events made it more likely that government would create public policy permitting individuals to reject unwanted medical treatment. In 1976, the Florida legislature became the first to consider a constitutional protection for the right to die, several universities created centers on bioethics, and the Harvard Medical School proposed a new definition of death based on symptoms of irreversible coma. The American Medical Association (AMA) and the Catholic Church continued to oppose legislation, but the AMA urged further discussion of the issues by doctors, patients, and families.
Innovation
The first major event serving as a window of opportunity for legislative policy entrepreneurs was the 1976 Karen Quinlan case. California, which often ranks high as an innovative state, had defeated a living-will law two years before, but with Quinlan in the news it became more legitimate for legislatures to act, and California became the first state to give patients the right to specify in a living will the kind of treatment they wanted or would refuse in the case of terminal illness.
As in other states later on, leadership for California's law came from a single legislator with intense personal interest in the issue. He was a lawyer and chair of a powerful committee and had had extensive experience with end-of-life treatment decisions both for his own family members and for clients. Nevertheless, despite his influence, the issue was controversial, and his early inside strategy failed. Building a coalition and favorable news coverage became the necessary components of a later successful outside strategy. Faced with this more sophisticated plan, the California Catholic Conference believed that legislation would pass soon in the liberal social climate of California, and, instead of trying to block a law-which might fail and produce much more far-reaching legislation-it decided to compromise on a weak statute.
California's lead stimulated a surge of innovation in several other western states in 1977, and nearly every state legislature soon had one or more right-to-die proposals before it. Overall, there are three factors which help to account for the passage of living-will laws in the American states: the growing number of facilitative state judicial decisions which steadily expanded patients' rights to refuse treatment, the growth in the number of articles appearing in the mass media, and the size of a state's Catholic population. The first two factors tend to increase enactment, but a large Catholic population-as a measure of Catholic political power-decreases the odds of passage. For example, Massachusetts, which normally is an innovative state but has a very large Catholic population, was one of the last to enact any right-todie legislation (Glick, 1992) .
Additional surges in legislation occurred in 1984 and 1985, and additional key national events encouraged many late adopters to join the early innovators. Faced with a rising stream of facilitative court decisions, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1984 adopted the California model of cooperation in order to get the weakest bills possible. The National Conference Commission on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) also began drafting a uniform state living-will law in 1984 and announced it in 1985.
State appellate courts have been very important contributors to right-to-die policy, and with few exceptions they have provided access to individuals and supported the rights of patients and their families to refuse unwanted medical treatment in a variety of medical circumstances, not only in the case of a terminal illness.
These decisions often have conflicted with more restrictive legislation and have led to continuous policymaking conflict between courts and legislatures. Whereas right-tolife groups have tended to dominate legislatures, supportive medical and right-to-die organizations have been more plentiful as amici in state courts. In many states, there is no uniform right-to-die policy.
During the past two decades, the right to die has been continually reinvented. The earliest policies permitted individuals to reject medical treatment in the case of terminal illness. Food and fluids administered by feeding tubes were considered ordinary 'comfort care' required for every patient. However, in 1985 the New Jersey Supreme Court again led the nation in ruling that there was no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care and that artificial feeding could be removed from terminally ill or permanently comatose patients. Other, but not all, state courts and legislatures quickly followed.
Reinvention continues. Years of experience with living wills have convinced many commentators that they are inadequate because they often apply only to a terminal illness, a diagnosis which often is postponed and comes very near the end of a debilitating and inevitable decline. Living wills also require difficult legal-like interpretation by doctors and families, and disputes sometimes occur. In their place, many advocates favor the durable power of attorney for health care, which allows another designated person to make all medical decisions on behalf of an incapacitated patient. Many states now have these as well as living-will laws. Assisted suicide also has reached the social agenda, even achieving policy innovation through a 1994 Oregon popular initiative, and it is unlikely that the right to die will soon become a settled and routine matter.
Following two decades of state innovation, the national government also entered right-to-die policymaking. Contrary to the trend, the Missouri Supreme Court in 1988 produced a very restrictive right-to-die policy when it denied a request from the parents of Nancy Cruzan to remove the feeding tubes which were keeping their permanently comatose daughter alive. It ruled that Nancy Cruzan had never clearly communicated her wishes regarding medical treatment and that the state had an interest in keeping her alive (Cruzan v Harman 1988) . In its first right-to-die decision in 1990, the US Supreme Court agreed that a patient must make her or his wishes clearly known, and it recommended written documents such as living wills (Cruzan v Director 1990) .
The emphasis on written documents received additional support in 1990, when Congress enacted the Patient Self Determination Act (see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990), which requires medical facilities to notify adult patients of their rights to execute documents under state right-to-die policies. However, few patents use these opportunities, and the dilemma of how to deal with end-of-life medical treatment decisions continues.
The Netherlands
The United States has had the most visible political debate regarding passive euthanasia. But in the Netherlands, right-to-die policymaking has focused almost solely upon voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Passive euthanasia appears to have become widely accepted and noncontroversial, and this is underscored by a 1991 government-sponsored medical survey reporting that approximately 35% of all deaths resulted from passive euthanasia: of nearly 129000 deaths annually, there were approximately 22 500 cases each of (1) withdrawing and withholding treatment, and (2) cases in which the administration of painkilling drugs had the 'secondary' effect of shortening life. In contrast, only about 3% of deaths were produced through active euthanasia and assisted suicide (van der Maas et al, 1991) . Despite the lack of official policy, the government committee reviewing the survey announced that passive euthanasia procedures should be considered 'normal medical practice' (Gevers, 1992, page 139) .
After over twenty years of political controversy, the Dutch Parliament adopted its first legislative innovation accepting voluntary active euthanasia in February 1993. This new law does not alter the Dutch Penal Code, which defines voluntary active euthanasia as criminal, with a possible prison sentence (Keown, 1992, page 34; New York Times 1993, page A5) , but the new law provides that physicians participating in voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide will not be prosecuted if they adhere to the following rules: (l)the patient requesting euthanasia must be competent and acting voluntarily; (2) the patient must have been given the opportunity to weigh other alternatives; (3) the patient must express a 'lasting longing for death'; (4) the patient must experience 'unbearable suffering' from an irreparable condition; (5) the physician must obtain collegial consent; (6) the physician must document and report compliance with the above conditions (New York Times 1993, page A5).
The new law also reaffirms that involuntary active euthanasia still is illegal. As in the United States, some Dutch advocates of the right to die once supported involuntary active euthanasia, but by the mid-1970s they concluded there was no widespread support for this policy, and, to retain any influence, they needed to limit their goals to the "solely voluntary character of euthanasia" (Fenigsen, 1990, page 237) . Although the 1993 law is the first legislative act, Dutch courts, like those in the United States, made several earlier innovative decisions that contributed to parliamentary action.
Agenda setting Dutch medical practice is widely viewed as the most permissive regarding voluntary active euthanasia, so it seems surprising that euthanasia is relatively new to the Dutch political agenda. Unlike the United States, Britain, and Germany, where right-to-die issues have percolated for years, active support for euthanasia in the Netherlands was never noticeable before the 1960s (van der Sluis, 1989, page 458). But, as in the United States, the issue began to receive significant attention on the medical agenda by the late 1960s. Perhaps the single most important influence was van den Berg's book Medical Power and Medical Ethics (1985) , in which he made a powerful case for involuntary active euthanasia for 'defective' newborns and 'hopelessly ill' patients (Fenigsen, 1990, pages 220-230 ). The language is very similar to that used by the early euthanasia advocates in the United States.
His book went through ten printings the first year, and, rather than producing protests, it won enthusiastic support from Protestant ministers and church authorities, Catholic intellectuals, ethics organizations, and leaders of the voluntary euthanasia movement (Fenigsen, 1990, page 230) . Given its extensive circulation and support, this book and similar writing increased awareness, but the issue did not take off in the mass agenda until more than ten years later, when a court case aroused the public. Just as the Quinlan case was largely responsible for a sharp ascent in public awareness in the United States, a 1973 trial in the Netherlands was the catalyst for public discussion in that country.
In 1973, a Dutch physician in Leeuwarden was prosecuted for administering a fatal dose of morphine to her terminally ill mother. The physician was convicted, but, as in many similar cases in the United States, she was given a suspended sentence. However, the judge produced a written innovative opinion that was very similar to the law that would be enacted nearly twenty years later. The trial judge stated that euthanasia would be permissible under the following conditions: (1) the disease must be incurable, (2) the patient's suffering must be unbearable, (3) the patient must be terminally ill, and (4) the patient must request euthanasia (van der Sluis, 1989, page 458). Even though the decision lacked the force of an appellate ruling, the judge's opinion has been viewed as having "established a legal precedent for medical mercy killing in the Netherlands" (page 458).
Dutch trial courts may have greater national impact than similar courts in the United States. First, the country's very small size and small number of courts and judges may arouse and focus public attention on controversial local events and policy. Second, Duch society is heterogeneous, but policymaking has been described as consociational or consensus oriented, and agreement takes place through elite-dominated secret negotiations (Lijphart, 1968) . Because the polity is very fragmented, courts may be able to make controversial and innovative policy more easily than can popularly elected legislators who are expected to strive for broad agreement. Such legislators also often find it difficult to put together a lawmaking coalition to overturn court decisions.
In addition to forecasting an important role for the Dutch courts in policy innovation, the case provided a window of opportunity for right-to-die policy entrepreneurs to pursue the issue on other agendas. Significantly, the Dutch Voluntary Active Euthanasia Society was founded just a few days after the landmark 1973 Leeuwarden court decision {Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973:183). The organization grew rapidly, and its lobbying efforts gradually "penetrated all non-religious political parties" (van der Sluis, 1989, page 458). Even more important, the prestigious Royal Dutch Medical Association [Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappig tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (KNMG)] issued a statement on euthanasia after the trial, carefully suggesting that a physician owes a duty both to the law and to the patient, but that these conflicting duties may have to be resolved in favor of ending unbearable suffering through the only means available-death. The KNMG further stimulated "a wide public debate on euthanasia" (de Wachter, 1989, page 3316) . As in the United States, the professional medical agenda led the mass agenda, and the KNMG in particular would prove extremely powerful in influencing policy innovation.
Innovation
As in the United States, courts were the most important early right-to-die innovators in the Netherlands. Through a series of policy reinventing decisions between 1973 and 1983, Dutch trial and appellate courts gradually agreed that for voluntary active euthanasia to be considered legal, the patient must make the request freely, and the patient's situation must be regarded as hopeless and involving unbearable pain, by 1984, collegial consultation generally was recognized as a third condition (de Wachter, 1989, page 3317; also, see de Wachter, 1992) .
Despite emerging judicial consensus on these criteria, medical practitioners were concerned that not all courts would adhere to a single uniform policy and that various physicians would be at risk throughout the country. The KNMG endorsed the three criteria promulgated by the courts, but it argued that the issue should be resolved by the national Supreme Court (de Wachter, 1989, page 3318) . Later in 1984 the Dutch Supreme Court affirmed the acquittal of a physician who had given a lethal injection to a dying 95-year-old patient {Alkmaar case; Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984:106). The patient had signed a living will and requested active euthanasia. Although the Supreme Court did not produce a comprehensive policy on euthanasia, the decision "made an opening to legally acceptable euthanasia on request" (de Wachter, 1989, page 3318) .
The courts and the KNMG were the two most powerful agents of policy reinvention, and they interacted in a 'symbiotic' relationship (de Wachter, 1992, page 25) . For example, in August 1984, three months before the Supreme Court decision, the KNMG central committee released a report delineating the criteria that should be met in cases of euthanasia, and the Supreme Court largely adopted its view (Keown, 1992, page 36) . Not only did the KNMG contribute to maintaining the issue on the mass agenda, it also was able to influence the content of judicial policy.
Although Dutch courts have taken the lead in creating the right to die, they never produced a single rule for proper medical procedure (Gevers, 1992, page 138) . Moreover, no clear consensus has existed within the medical profession regarding the conditions justifying euthanasia; medical opinion has been divided over ethical issues as well as technical matters such as treatment and diagnosis (Keown, 1992, page 41) . The KNMG and others called for legislation which would produce clear guidelines and legal protection for physicians. As in the United States, calls for legislation were controversial, and opponents quickly materialized, but euthanasia legislation was 'in the air' by the mid-1980s.
Despite early judicial innovation, opponents were able to delay comprehensive national legislation. The government in 1982 established the State Commission on Euthanasia, but the creation of the commission appears to have been both a symbolic recognition of demands for euthanasia legislation and a temporary deflection of the issue, for not until 1985-after the Supreme Court decision and other attempts at legislation-did the Commission publicly advise the government to modify the penal code to make exceptions for doctors treating terminally ill and suffering patients. In 1984, a secular political party introduced a bill calling for the legalization of voluntary active euthanasia, but the dominant Christian Democratic Party, which is heavily influenced by fundamentalist Protestants and Catholics, blocked enactment (Gevers, 1992, page 139; van der Sluis, 1989 , page 459) and prevented consideration of the less far-reaching Commission recommendations as well. Supportive Liberals and Labourites did not try to overcome the opposition because of the emphasis on consensus rather than majoritarianism (Lijphart, 1968) .
By blocking bills, requesting studies, and maintaining a firm position the opponents to euthanasia termporarily kept the issue off the decisional agenda. In 1986 the government restated its opposition to legislation and expressed its support for case law to evolve (Sluyters, 1989, page 39) . Despite opposition from conservative religious groups, the government could not forever fend off growing professional, popular, and parliamentary support for legislation. In 1987 it submitted its own more limited proposal to parliament. The Medical Practice Act would allow exceptions to criminal liability only in cases of overwhelming suffering (Gevers, 1992, page 139) . A debate on both the new and previous legislation was scheduled for 1989, but the Socialist and Christian Democratic coalition fell in 1989, and neither the 1984 bill nor the government's proposal were considered.
In negotiating the creation of a new cabinet, the two parties agreed to place voluntary active euthanasia on the decisional agenda and to enact legislation that would reflect the results of a future, government-sanctioned, nationwide survey of physicians (Gevers, 1992, page 139) . However, even before the results of this study were published, the Minister of Justice, under heavy lobbying by the KNMG, agreed to an administrative ruling that would reduce or eliminate the prosecution of physicians for euthanasia.
In 1991, after the results of the national study were published, the government proposed the legislation, described at the beginning of this section, which protects physicians from prosecution if they follow certain requirements. The law was a compromise between Socialists, who favored outright legalization, and Christian Democrats, who opposed it (ten Have and Welie, 1992, page 37). Final parliamentary approval was given on 9 February 1993. As there is no support for involuntary active euthanasia, and other concerns have not developed, the right to die seems at least temporarily off the Dutch agenda.
Germany
In contrast to the Netherlands, where active euthanasia is a fairly recent issue, euthanasia has a much longer and more problematic history in Germany.
(2) As in other countries, it is generally deemed acceptable for German physicians to withdraw or withhold treatment from dying patients, and there is no law on this form of the right to die (Koch and Ulshoefer, 1987, page 25) . It seems that German society has always considered passive euthanasia "a matter between doctors and their patients", and there exists "no known case of a German court questioning a patient's right to reject clearly inadequate and inefficient treatment" (Karcher, 1992, page 9) . However, voluntary active euthanasia and involuntary active euthanasia are expressly forbidden.
German history and attitudes toward suicide are very different, and they have influenced current right-to-die practices. Unlike many other countries, suicide has been legal since the mid-1700s. Physician-assisted suicide is also legal, but is said to be contrary to professional and social norms (Battin, 1992) . However, other privately assisted suicide is both legal and tolerated, and it seems to occur fairly often. The situation in Germany is, then, "the obverse of the Netherlands" (Battin, 1992 , page 44); however, no data are available on how many deaths in Germany involve passive euthanasia or assisted suicide.
To understand how the German polity arrived at this unique social behavior, it is necessary to consider the historical context which constrains national policymakers. The agenda-setting process in Germany is somewhat similar to that of other Western nations, but unique experiences have shaped the content of policy.
Agenda setting
As in the United States and the Netherlands, right-to-die issues appeared on the professional medical agenda prior to reaching the mass public. The euthanasia issue first appeared on the public agenda in the late-19th century through the racial hygiene movement founded by several prominent physicians (Garver and Garver, 1991) . Of course by 1943 the euthanasia program had metamorphosed and metastatized to mass genocide under the Nazis.
The horrors of the Holocaust still weigh heavily on Germany, and the very mention of 'euthanasia' evokes memories of the dark and inhumane past. Consequently, there have been no legislative or judicial innovations officially recognizing W Battin (1991, page 298) notes that the provision of health care in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was administered under a system which differed markedly from that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Accordingly, we confine our inquiry to the FRG. We can, however, offer some brief comments on the GDR. In East Germany, although medical ethics started to develop in the 1970s, it does not appear that euthanasia ever occupied a prominent place on the public or governmental agenda. In a 1989 paper, an East German professor wrote, "Medical care provided in the framework of Marxist -Leninist medical ethics is based on rationality and humanity", and he went on to argue that socialist health protection and morality ethics do not permit euthanasia of any sort (Luther, 1989 , page 289). the right to die. But isolated advocates have attempted to create controversy through unsuccessful outside strategies.
In a similar way to civil rights protestors in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, they first tried to force the courts to act by openly defying the law. In the 1970s and early 1980s, two medical doctors, Hans Atrott and Julius Hackenthall, invited lawsuits by making public their use of voluntary active euthanasia. But government authorities clearly wanted to avoid addressing the issue, and they declined to prosecute (Karcher, 1992, page 304) . Therefore, whereas going to court in other countries has been an important source of innovation as well as a chance to create windows of opportunity for stirring legislative agendas, the right to die has been kept off the judicial agenda in Germany. A second strategy has been to place the issue on the mass agenda and then to lobby for legislative innovation through an outside strategy. In 1980, Atrott founded the German Society for Humane Dying [Deutsche Gesellschaft Human Sterben (DGHS)]. The organization was able to attract members and capture some media coverage, and in 1981 Atrott led a public campaign to repeal the law prohibiting voluntary active euthanasia. However, medical practitioners, politicians of every political persuasion, and Protestant and Catholic clergy were vehemently opposed (Schone-Seifert and Rippe, 1992, page 26). "The idea had no chance in a country where euthanasia is still a dirty word" (Karcher, 1992, page 9) .
Right-to-die proponents also attempted to place active euthanasia on various professional agendas, but this too has largely failed. Compared with the United States and the Netherlands, German medicine is often described as 'paternalistic', and there is "no professionally felt need to provide courses in systematic, philosophically oriented medical ethics for medical students" (Schone-Seifert and Rippe, 1991, page 24). Moreover, a 'traditional physicians' ethos' is evident, and many prominent German physicians are outspoken opponents of legalized voluntary active euthanasia (Schone-Seifert and Rippe, 1991, pages 24-26).
Nonetheless, the medical profession is not entirely homogenous, and in 1986 a small panel of physicians and lawyers published an "Alternative Draft Law for Aid in Dying", which would legalize voluntary active euthanasia. However, the much larger 56th Conference of German Lawyers and Physicians quickly rejected their proposal by majority vote (Schone-Seifert and Rippe, 1991, page 26), and the issue was easily purged from the professional agenda.
Philosophers and ethicists also rarely have discussed euthanasia. Their agenda enlarged temporarily between 1986 and 1989, when bioethics, which had been important in other countries for more than a decade, became more visible in Germany. New academic debate over euthanasia also followed a 1985 poll conducted for the DGHS in which it was found that about two thirds of Germans favored legal voluntary active euthanasia (Schone-Seifert and Rippe, 1991, page 26).
However, public support was stymied by a 'broken' window of opportunity. In 1989, Australian philosopher Peter Singer, who argues for active euthanasia for malformed newborn infants, was scheduled to speak in Marburg, Germany. Singer's arrival was greeted by a nearly demagogic backlash, with demonstrations and protests organized by advocates of the handicapped and the elderly, who likened Singer's views to the Nazi eugenics movement. The academic community also squelched discussion. Before Singer, "it looked as if there were a need for young scholars in [bioethics] , yet now an interest in Anglo-American bioethics might jeopardize an academic career" (Schone-Seifert and Rippe, 1991, page 22).
By 1991, right-to-die issues appeared to have vanished from all German agendas, and the 'Singer affair' was an opportunity for conservative, religious, and many other groups worried about Germany's past to limit discussion and visibility on the social agenda and block the issue entirely from government consideration.
Innovation
There have been no government-sanctioned innovations in Germany, but there are some informal social alternatives. As mentioned previously, German physicians seem to have considerable freedom in passive euthanasia. However, German medicine has a reputation for being authoritarian, and patients have very little control over treatment decisions. Recent research also suggests that living wills and DNR orders are rarely used (Battin, 1992, page 45) . To provide an alternative to apparently inflexible medical practices and blocked judicial and legislative agendas, the DGHS has become a source of information and support for those wishing to exercise their right to die with dignity without having to rely on uncertain help from physicians. As privately assisted suicide is not prohibited in Germany, the principal function of the DGHS is to make suicide a viable option. The organization provides members with a booklet listing 'recipes' for a painless death, offers advice on how to obtain necessary barbiturates, and has even arranged for individuals to obtain prescription drugs from other countries (Battin, 1992) . Reports are collected and updated regarding members' suicides.
The DGHS has abandoned its previous attempts to influence policymaking, and it has not joined the World Federation of Right-To-Die Societies, which promotes legislation. Owing largely to the DGHS, the German situation seems anomalous in that "the option of self-produced death is more clearly open in Germany than in Holland or the United States" (Battin, 1991, page 301) , but other forms of the right to die are not officially or privately sanctioned.
Great Britain
Support for help in dying originated in Great Britain in the 1800s, and political conflicts there stimulated agenda setting in the United States. The right to die has been on the public agenda in Great Britain ever since, but Britain hs produced few policy innovations.
At first glance, the approach to passive euthanasia in Great Britain seems similar to the Dutch and German cases. There are few legal constraints on physicians, and the British Medical Association (BMA) recently adopted permissive guidelines regarding the withdrawing and withholding of treatment (Nowell-Smith, 1989) . Unlike in the United States, passive euthanasia has not produced as much visible controversy, which has been attributed to differences in medical practice between the two nations. "There has been a marked tendency in the United States ... to attempt to prolong life-at all costs ... We simply do not have this problem in Britain" (Smith, 1990, page 135) . However, as discussed below, apparent complacency toward passive euthanasia may be deceptive and may be a strategy of organized medicine to keep the right to die off all agendas.
Agenda setting
As in the other countries we have considered, the euthanasia issue first appeared on professional agendas. Many observers trace the origins of modern discussion and political conflict over the right to die to Great Britain in the 1870s, when various intellectuals proposed voluntary active euthanasia for the hopelessly ill (Kamisar, 1958) . In 1935, following several decades of debate and writing on euthanasia, a group of British doctors, Protestant theologians, teachers, prominent intellectuals, and writers formed the Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation Society (VES) in order to propose a bill to parliament permitting voluntary active euthanasia for seriously ill patients over the age of 21 years. The bill had elaborate procedures and safeguards to ensure that a patient was suffering great pain from terminal illness and was requesting death, and to guard against killing the patient without clear consent (Kamisar, 1958) . However, the bill was defeated mainly as a result of the speeches of two physician members of parliament (Helme, 1991, page 26) .
Not until the immediate memory of World War 2 had faded would voluntary active euthanasia again reach the British decisional agenda, but all similar bills have been rejected. Several related features of British medicine keep these issues off the decisional agenda. First, the right to die in any form has not been an important item on the British medical agenda. Unlike in the United States, "serious ethical discussion hardly ever appears in British journals" (Saunders, 1992, page 254) . Second, as in Germany, British medicine has been characterized as 'paternalistic', with little need for 'consumer rights' such as those in the United States. Britain is perceived as a homogenous society with widespread agreement on the proper role of medicine. Patients are said to trust their physicians, and physicians have the power to act without informing patients of their decisions (Smith, 1990) . When physicians do express their views about the right to die, they routinely oppose legislation, claiming there is no need for public policy as the withdrawal and withholding of treatment is common in hopeless cases and citizens have the power to complain about improper treatment through the National Health Service.
In 1988, the VES, in another attempt to promote support for permissive euthanasia legislation, submitted a proposal to a standing committee of the BMA (Nowell- Smith, 1989, page 125) . The committee sustained its support for passive nontreatment decisions, but it summarily rejected calls for voluntary active euthanasia, referring to the practice as "killing the patient" (Nowell- Smith, 1989, page 128) . Even more indicative of the BMA's conservative views toward the right to die, the organization also recently objected to legally binding advance medical directives such as living wills (Dyer, 1992, page 305) , which reinforces perceptions that the profession has a 'paternalistic attitude' toward patients' rights (Pace et al, 1991, page 169 ). This attitude is reflected well in a statement made by a British physician:
"In Britain, sound unhurried clinical judgement, sympathy, understanding and mutual trust, rather than abstract principles and printed policy statements, have in general stood patients in good stead" (Bayliss, 1982 (Bayliss, , page 1375 . Despite opposition from the medical profession, the public supports voluntary active euthanasia (Nowell-Smith, 1989; Williams, 1989) . Employing the same Gallup questions that have been used for decades in the United States to track public opinion (Glick, 1992) , researchers have found that 62% of the British public in the 1970s, and by the end of the 1980s 75%, support voluntary active euthanasia (Helme, 1991; Williams, 1989) . Citing these poll results, VES activists have lobbied parliament, but, facing opposition from organized medicine, they have had no success. Similar to the situation in other countries, the failure of the euthanasia society to move the legislative agenda is a good illustration that mass opinion alone is not sufficient for producing innovations. Prestigious elites who also claim expertise in a policy field and who are routinely consulted in the writing of legislation are more essential ingredients for obtaining new policy.
Innovation
There have been very few government decisions supporting the right to die. Various parliamentary backbenchers have submitted bills, but, as before, on 8 May 1990 voluntary active euthanasia was overwhelmingly again defeated by the House of Commons (191 votes to 35) (Helme, 1991, page 25) . Even living-will laws receive no support (Dyer, 1992, page 603) . A parliamentary correspondent observes:
"The chances of substantive legislation on any aspect of euthanasia are still considered to be remote. Although the euthanasia society claims that about 90 MPs are sympathetic to euthanasia, few would openly support it in the run up to a general election. There has never been a serious attempt in the Commons to legislate for euthanasia" (Warden, 1992 , page 10). Clearly, British political leaders are unwilling to expend political capital on such a controversial issue without support from medical and other professional groups.
Judicial innovation has been only slightly more encouraging for advocates of the right to die. Although suicide is legal in Great Britain, assisted suicide is not, and in 1981 the secretary of the VES was convicted of aiding and abetting suicide by distributing a booklet titled A Guide to Self-deliverance. He was sentenced to a relatively harsh two and a half years in prison (Kennedy, 1988, page 162) . Recently, British courts have been somewhat more sympathetic to the right to die. In the early 1990s, several doctors were cleared of mercy-killing charges or given suspended sentences (Brahams, 1992) , and in 1992 a British court concluded that a patient's living will should be legally binding on physicians (Dyer, 1992) . Later that year, a living-will form designed for persons with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome was developed by researchers at King's College, London, but physicians continued to object to living wills. However, if living wills are legally contested, courts could be the vehicles for future innovation (Dyer, 1992, page 602) .
Innovation also may occur if British medicine is not always able to dominate right-to-die politics. Despite claims from the BMA and prominent physicians that passive euthanasia is common and there is no need for euthanasia legislation-a claim heard early and often from doctors and the Catholic Church in the United Statesthere is evidence that not everyone is convinced that doctors always know best.
First, despite claims that passive euthanasia is routine and efforts to keep patients alive 'at all costs' are rare, occasional case vignettes describing questionable life-prolonging treatments have appeared over the years in British medical journals. Perhaps sensing a problem and acknowledging public concerns, as mentioned above, the BMA in 1988 issued guidelines to physicians for making treatment withdrawal and withholding decisions (Nowell-Smith, 1989, page 124; Pace et al, 1991) . Whereas living wills have been favored in the United States since the 1960s, they are only now beginning to surface in Great Britain. Underscoring doubts about the prevalence of passive euthanasia, one medical writer recently argued that living wills would be helpful in avoiding useless cardiopulmonary resuscitation on elderly and incompetent patients and for limiting the power of doctors who sometimes overrule the wishes of relatives in these cases (Saunders, 1992, page 255) . Finally, some observers claim that trust in physicians and satisfaction with the consumer complaint procedures of the National Health Service have been declining, which further undercuts the view that the public blindly accepts physicians' judgment (Smith, 1990, page 137) .
Continued concern with life-prolonging treatment and interest in living wills suggests that passive euthanasia may not be routine or a settled issue in Great Britain. Not only will proposals supporting voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide remain on the British agenda, but passive euthanasia and advance medical directives may also keep the right-to-die issue before the public and the government for years to come.
Comparative analysis
Overview of right-to-die policy This research on the right to die has two main purposes. First, we are interested in how right-to-die issues have been addressed in the four Western industrialized nations discussed. Second, we have sought to apply theories of agenda setting and innovation cross-nationally and to contribute to theory-based comparative work on the development and production of policy.
The content of the right to die generally is similar in all of the countries studied here, but there are differences which reflect the distinctive histories, social conditions, and political organization in each nation. Voluntary active euthanasia has been part of the political agendas in all countries, but in the United States most discussion and policymaking has centered on passive euthanasia or the withdrawal or withholding of unwanted or fruitless treatment. In Europe, passive euthanasia is said to be common, and political conflict has centered on voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide. There is persuasive evidence that this is so in the Netherlands, but doubts persist about Great Britain.
It is plausible that the withdrawal of treatment is more of an issue in the United States than elsewhere, for several reasons. First, although new medical technologies are available in all of these nations, the chances are good they have become most advanced and available in the richer United States. Second, until recently, medical practice in the United States has been largely free from significant government controls, such as a national health service, and much less concerned with the cost of treatment. Therefore, it is likely that fruitless and unwanted but expensive treatments may be prescribed more often. The fear of medical malpractice lawsuits also has led many physicians to practise defensive medicine in which they order many diagnostic tests and treatments in order to prove they have done everything medically possible. Third, the importance of treatment withdrawal as the central rightto-die issue is evidenced by the recent debate over national health-care reform, which has begun to link medical costs to treatments provided during the last six months of life and to the very elderly.
In Europe, each nation has some form of national health insurance and concern about medical costs, which may limit the use of expensive treatments at the end of life. There is very little evidence available for any country except the Netherlands regarding actual end-of-life treatment decisionmaking. As mentioned, the results of a national survey of physicians in the Netherlands strongly suggest that passive euthanasia is common, and recent political conflict has focused on more active ways to end suffering. Although it has a large Catholic population, the Netherlands also has a very strong liberal orientation to personal freedom, and the nation has reached a compromise on voluntary active euthanasia. The United States and Germany also have sizable Catholic populations-30% and 44%, respectively-but the Church seems to exert a stronger competitive political force in social policy.
Physicians and medical writers in Germany and Great Britain maintain that passive euthanasia is practised there too, as in the Netherlands, but it is difficult to know for sure. Medical practice in these nations has been characterized as 'paternal' or even authoritarian, without much patient input concerning treatment, and there is no corroboration about end-of-life treatment decisionmaking. Therefore, we need to be skeptical about whether widespread passive euthanasia exists and is the reason why voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide are on the agenda in these countries. Perhaps physicians believe and maintain that passive euthanasia is widely practised, in order to deflect more active policies from the agenda. In Britain, recent interest in living wills and calls for withholding treatment from the very elderly and other seriously ill individuals suggests that none of the issues is settled and that the agenda may enlarge to include passive euthanasia.
Variables for models of agenda setting and innovation
There are similarities and differences in agenda setting and innovation in each of these countries, but the theories work well for organizing and conceptualizing the policymaking process.
Professional and mass agendas
First, as has been discovered in other research on agenda setting, professional agendas lead the public agenda. The right to die appeared first on the professional medical agendas in each country and stimulated journalists to write about it, and, in time, the public became well aware of the right-to-die issue. Public support for passive and voluntary active euthanasia also has increased over time as these issues have come to occupy more and more of the professional and mass agendas.
It appears that in order for right-to-die innovation to occur, the issue must be maintained on both agendas and must receive support from both the mass public and professionals. The most liberal policy has been adopted in the Netherlands, where euthanasia enjoys support from both a majority in the polity and in the medical profession. In Britain, where no innovation has occurred, the right to die receives mass support but is opposed by practitioners and the BMA. Similarly, in Germany, voluntary active euthanasia receives considerable mass support but little professional support. German lawmakers have refused to take up the issue, leading the DGHS to develop an alternative direct-to-the-public program. In the United States, despite early polls favoring the right to die, no policymaking occurred until political elites also gave their support.
Significance of single actors
Issue maintenance on the professional and mass agendas is often the result of a concerted effort led by a single individual. In the United States, persistent policy entrepreneurs have been responsible for propelling the right to die onto state decisional agendas. The first state to consider the issue (Florida) did so largely at the behest of a physician legislator, and in California the sponsor of the bill was an attorney with extensive personal experience in end-of-life treatment decisions. Recently, in Michigan, the adoption by the state legislature of a law banning assisted suicide came in response to the highly publicized and unrelenting activities of retired pathologist, Jack Kevorkian. Without the Kevorkian factor, it is unlikely that Michigan lawmakers would ever have taken up the subject (Fino and Strate, 1993) . (3) In Germany, Atrott is most often associated with the right-to-die movement. Atrott gained notoriety in the 1970s by attempting to force the issue on the courts and by lobbying for legislative reform, and the DGHS was Atrott's idea. In Great Britain, no single individual appears to have been a steadfast leader in the right-todie issue, although different members of parliament have offered bills over the years.
In the Netherlands, single actors seem less important than group action through consensus politics. The national medical association spurred action following court cases, and the legislature finally responded as other group and public support developed. Politics in the Netherlands illustrates the need to take government structure and political traditions into account in predicting the role of individuals and groups.
Overall, though, the right to die is a very controversial issue that is not championed by political parties or governments or broad social movements. Rather, it develops most often through the concerted efforts of individuals inside or outside the government who have a lasting desire to see right-to-die legislation enacted. When public and elite support builds, opponents compromise and legislatures act.
Outside and inside initiative strategies
The right to die has been a controversial issue everywhere, and outside political strategies always are the only paths for getting the issue onto legislative agendas. Political elites prefer using an inside strategy because they encounter fewer obstacles, costs, delays, and uncertainties in the path to policymaking, but although inside strategies have been tried for the right to die they always have led either to the temporary removal of the issue from the agenda or to outside strategies in which advocates have to contend with hostile and aggresive opponents who are immediately stirred to action.
Events as windows of opportunity
The importance of unusual and highly publicized events as windows of opportunity in agenda setting has been demonstrated well by this research. Health issues, such as the right to die, affect individuals one at a time, but their plight has aroused broad public concern through the early repetition of similar court cases. Depending upon the political traditions in each country, the judicial agenda sometimes contributes independently to public policy, but innovative court decisions also serve as windows of opportunity for those who seek broader, more comprehensive legislation.
Right-to-die proponents in the United States and the Netherlands were able to garner public attention and capitalize upon the 1976 Quintan case and the 1973 Leeuwaarden trial, respectively. These prominent cases put the item initially on the judicial branch of the decisional agenda and helped to propel the right to die onto legislative agendas as well. (4) Although these kinds of events generate public interest, their occurrence does not guarantee the arrival of the issue onto the mass agenda. In Germany, Hackenthall and Atrott both made dramatic attempts to implicate themselves publicly in euthanasia suits. German prosecutors seemed to recognize the importance of the courts as sources of agenda setting when they refused to prosecute these physicians. They tried to keep closed that window of opportunity. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, although prosecution of practitioners has resulted in convictions, judges have generally given suspended sentences. This leniency in sentencing has precluded campaigns to portray the convicted doctors as martyrs.
However, just as right-to-die advocates can exploit events in order to promote the issue on the mass agenda (5) , those hostile to the issue sometimes can utilize key events in order to purge it from the public agenda. The Singer affair in Germany (4) Right-to-die supporters in Western industrialized democracies do not have a monopoly on this strategy; calls for death with dignity have similarly gained an impressive audience in China. In 1986 the issue exploded onto the mass agenda when two doctors were tried for assisting a terminally ill patient to die. This case was given extensive coverage by the mass press and "stirred the whole country, and precipitated further discussions" (Pu, 1991, page 132) . < 5 ) In order for an event to serve as a window of opportunity, individuals must be able and willing to open the window. In Japan, for example, in 1991 a physician was investigated for involvement in active voluntary euthanasia. Rather than attempting to utilize this potential window, the Japanese Society for Dying With Dignity declined to endorse the doctor. The groups' chairman, Taneo Oki, argues that the time is not yet right to pursue the more active forms of euthanasia: "It is too early taking the spiritual climate of Japan into consideration ... We aim at passive euthanasia" (Shimbun, 1992 , page 7).
can be viewed as a broken window of opportunity for right-to-die supporters; opponents were able effectively to paralyze the mass and professional agendas.
Conditions necessary for obtaining innovative policy decisions
It seems clear that popular support is insufficient in any of these countries to stimulate the governmental agenda and obtain policy innovation. Although favorable public opinion probably is a necessary condition for innovation on a controversial and salient issue such as the right to die, active support from prestigious elites, typically organized medicine, and the acquiescence of strong opponents, usually the Catholic Church, are necessary before government will act.
In Germany and Great Britain, except for the euthanasia societies, no prestigious elites or organizations support euthanasia legislation, and it has not been enacted in these countries. In the United States, different conditions prevail. First, unlike Europe, innovation has taken place piecemeal among the individual states. Once conservative political forces acquiesced in liberal California, innovation became possible and stimulated other states either quickly to enact similar laws or at least to consider them. The initial adoption of an innovation such as in California is crucial in breaking a perception of solid opposition to a new policy and gives policy entrepreneurs in other states an opportunity to argue that the idea is realistic and possible. In time, powerful organized opponents have changed their positions either to active support or to acquiescence, and right-to-die innovations diffused gradually throughout the entire country.
Policy reinvention
Reinvention during the adoption of policies does occur, although, except for the United States, we have few detailed data. In the United States, courts and legislatures have altered right-to-die policies over time in response to past experiences and new demands. In the Netherlands, the courts added to protections for physicians over time, and the national legislature largely endorsed these judicial decisions. There has been no governmental innovation in the right to die in Germany or Great Britain, so it is unclear how these issues will evolve.
Governmental structure
The type of constitutional system under which policy is made shapes policy development. In large nations with a strong tradition of federalism, much policymaking on controversial issues is left to subnational units. The American states have dealt individually with the subject of passive euthanasia, and they have adopted different types of laws over time. The US federal system demonstrates substantial respect for autonomy at the subnational level, and the only federal right-to-die law, the Patient Self Determination Act, merely compels hospitals and nursing homes to advise patients of their rights under the laws in their state.
In smaller countries with more centralized systems of government, national leaders develop policy and set standards. Dutch and British practitioners are bound by national laws, and, in the Netherlands, these national laws are a function of consociational democracy. In Britain, policy outputs are the result of a majoritarian process of national parliamentary lawmaking. Governments in such a system are known for their ability to enforce party-line voting and to present a homogeneous legislative front. The Conservative Party, in power for well over a decade, has vowed to oppose all permissive euthanasia legislation, and individual policy entrepreneurs are unlikely to be successful on the right to die. The German federal system gives the national government the power to formulate policy, but policy implementation is left up to the states. Therefore, the German states have enormous power to determine the actual contours of policy (Sbragia, 1992) . However, no government or coalition has taken up the euthanasia question, and given the special sensitivity to euthanasia in Germany, politicians avoid the issue altogether.
Conclusions
This exploratory research involving the right to die demonstrates that major concepts within agenda-setting and innovation theory can help to organize comparative research on similar issues in comparable political settings, and it is possible to draw conclusions about the political processes and forces that typically are involved in the emergence, development, and content of political issues and their transformation into government policy.
However, refinements are needed both in theory and in data. Theories of innovation have been operationalized and applied very successfully to the diffusion of policies, and, to some extent, their reinvention, in the United States. It is also possible to apply these methods to studying the diffusion of policy innovation in other countries where local or regional governments have some independent political authority, and there is a growing literature which examines cross-national policy innovation and diffusion.
Agenda-setting research also contributes much to our understanding of the policymaking process and it is crucial for completing the puzzle about why governments adopt particular policies. But it is much less well developed and operationalized for understanding precisely how issues move through a political system. Part of the problem stems from uncertainty about the data needed for demonstrating the agendasetting process. Ideas and actors can come from anywhere, and the possibility always exists that an important actor or event will be overlooked. Reliable methods exist for tracing the movement of issues on professional and mass agendas, but these involve painstaking tabulation and content analysis of articles in professional and popular media over time. This may be manageable with access to libraries with indices to these documents. More difficult to manage, but equally necessary, are on-site interviews with political activists and officials involved with similar policies in several different countries. Nevertheless, if comparative agenda-setting research is to advance, it will be necessary to seek to overcome these problems.
Finally, this research on the right to die deals with a single very controversial issue that, to our knowledge, has never been part of a government program. Outside strategies led by individuals, often following innovative and controversial court cases also initiated by individuals, usually have been necessary for gaining wider official attention. But, for agenda-setting and innovation theory to develop, we need to examine the emergence and processing of issues that are regular parts of government programs, remain on government agendas for years, but often are regularly reinvented. Agenda-setting and innovation theory provide a way to examine and compare how different types of policies are dealt with by different governments and societies, which could add considerably to our knowledge of the policymaking process.
